A fundamental reorientation in how Germans perceive China appears to be underway, driven by mounting job losses and sustained economic pressures that have made Berlin's traditionally cautious approach to Beijing increasingly untenable. New polling data reveals that German public opinion has hardened considerably, with nearly half the population now viewing China as either a rival or an adversary—a sentiment that comfortably exceeds that found across other major European economies and suggests Berlin's government may have considerable political latitude to pursue tougher trade measures without facing domestic backlash.
The European Council on Foreign Relations, a prominent European think tank, found that 49 per cent of Germans polled classified China as primarily a rival or adversary, substantially outpacing France's 43 per cent despite Paris's longstanding advocacy for more aggressive EU trade interventionism. Meanwhile, only 38 per cent of German respondents hold positive views of China, portraying it as either a partner or ally. This contrasts sharply with sentiment elsewhere in Europe, where 65 per cent of Spaniards and 62 per cent of Bulgarians express favourable attitudes towards Beijing. The data underscores how unevenly the Chinese economic challenge has been distributed across the continent, with Germany bearing disproportionate costs.
The scale of Germany's manufacturing crisis provides crucial context for understanding this attitudinal shift. Between 2019 and 2025, the country's industrial sector shed approximately 420,000 jobs, with the haemorrhaging continuing at a rate of roughly 10,000 positions monthly. The automotive industry, traditionally Germany's economic powerhouse and a source of national pride, has borne the brunt of this transition, progressively losing market share both domestically and internationally to Chinese competitors who have expanded their influence with remarkable speed. This structural transformation has transformed what was once an abstract geopolitical concern into immediate, tangible economic hardship affecting workers, their families, and entire regional economies dependent on traditional manufacturing.
Germany's governing coalition has thus far approached China policy with considerable hesitancy, embodying a defensive posture that appears increasingly misaligned with public concern. During 2024, Berlin notably abstained from supporting European Union initiatives to impose anti-subsidy duties on Chinese electric vehicles, standing apart from the bloc's broader consensus. This reluctance reflects internal government divisions, particularly within Chancellor Friedrich Merz's cabinet where Economy Minister Katherina Reiche has emerged as the strongest advocate for maintaining the status quo. Reiche, herself a member of Merz's Christian Democratic Union, has resisted characterising the economic challenge as a "China shock 2.0" and has been most hesitant about authorising defensive trade mechanisms.
However, polling evidence suggests German policymakers face minimal electoral risk should they abandon their cautious approach. The research indicates that no fewer than 60 per cent of supporters from both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats regard China as an adversary or rival, providing a substantial voter coalition that would likely support more assertive policy responses. This political foundation cuts across Germany's centrist mainstream, suggesting that any shift towards hawkishness would reflect public sentiment rather than impose costs upon elected officials. The consensus for tougher action extends across constituencies that have traditionally exercised considerable political influence in Berlin.
Interestingly, the political alignment on China differs markedly from traditional left-right divisions in German politics. The centre-left Social Democrats have proven surprisingly hawkish, with a combined 60 per cent viewing China as a rival or adversary—a position that contradicts the party's historical preference for diplomatic engagement and softer approaches to Beijing. By contrast, both extreme parties—the far-right Alternative for Germany and the Left—display considerably warmer attitudes towards China. The AfD, which has led in numerous recent political surveys and could perform strongly in some regional elections this year, shows notably positive sentiment, with 45 per cent characterising China as a necessary partner and only 31 per cent viewing it as a rival. This bifurcation suggests that China policy has transcended traditional ideological boundaries, instead reflecting different assessments of economic threat and strategic interest.
A symbolic turning point emerged recently when Volkswagen's chief executive made an unprecedented public call for European Commission tariffs on Chinese plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, reversing his company's adamant opposition to similar duties just months earlier. This represents far more than a single executive's change of mind; it signals recognition within Germany's automotive establishment that the competitive threat from Chinese manufacturers has become so acute that the time-honoured strategy of lobbying Berlin and Brussels for inaction has simply ceased to be viable. Noah Barkin, an expert in German-China relations at the Rhodium Group, described this development as "new territory," emphasising that the scale of competitive pressure has fundamentally altered calculations about what constitutes rational business advocacy. When Germany's industrial leaders begin publicly supporting trade restrictions they previously opposed, the structural shift becomes impossible to ignore.
For Malaysia and Southeast Asia, Germany's evolving position carries substantial implications. As a major trading bloc and a crucial node in global manufacturing networks, the European Union's direction on Chinese economic competition directly influences how other developed economies approach similar pressures. Should Berlin decisively shift towards more restrictive trade measures, this would substantially strengthen momentum within Brussels for coordinated EU action against Chinese commercial practices. Such European moves would likely reverberate through international trade governance frameworks and potentially embolden other developed economies—including Australia, Japan, and potentially others—to pursue their own defensive measures. The region's manufacturers and exporters would face a more fragmented, less predictable global trading environment.
Moreover, Germany's reassessment reflects a broader reordering within the developed world regarding how to balance engagement with China against protection of domestic economic interests. For several decades, the dominant approach emphasised integrating China into global economic structures on the assumption that mutual prosperity would create incentives for cooperative behaviour. Germany, as Europe's manufacturing heartland and a country with particularly deep economic ties to China, exemplified this strategy. The failure of this integration model to prevent aggressive competitive behaviour and market distortion is now forcing a recognition that economic interdependence alone does not guarantee aligned interests or ethical behaviour. This lesson carries relevance for all developed economies attempting to navigate relationships with China while protecting their industrial bases.
The timing of this German awakening matters considerably. As the European Union itself grapples with questions about strategic autonomy, industrial resilience, and appropriate responses to non-market economic practices, Germany's shift towards acknowledging the "China shock" provides political space for Brussels to pursue more coherent and forceful policies. Historically, German reluctance to endorse restrictive measures against China has constrained EU ambitions, given Germany's economic weight and influence within the bloc. If Berlin's government moves towards explicit acknowledgement that tougher measures enjoy public support and are economically necessary, this could catalyse a more unified European approach. The question no longer concerns whether Berlin should support firmer China policy, but rather how quickly policymakers will translate evident public sentiment into concrete institutional action. The political conditions for change have crystallised; implementation now awaits political will.
