The Sabah state government has signalled its resolute position that implementation of the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency Act 2024 cannot undermine the state's long-established immigration sovereignty. Speaking in the State Legislative Assembly in Kota Kinabalu on July 22, Assistant Minister to the Chief Minister Datuk Joniston Bangkuai articulated the administration's principled stance, making clear that federal legislation must accommodate rather than diminish Sabah's constitutional prerogatives.
The state leadership has formally communicated its position to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, emphasizing that the Sabah State Immigration Department must remain the primary authority governing all entry points across the state. This institutional safeguard is integral to how the state government intends to preserve its control mechanisms. Beyond maintaining departmental autonomy, Sabah is equally insistent that the power to issue Not-To-Land notices—a critical tool for controlling undesirable entry—cannot be transferred to or shared with the new federal agency.
While acknowledging that the Act 860 legislation itself falls squarely within federal legislative power, Joniston articulated a crucial distinction: federal authority does not extend to diluting the constitutionally-protected immigration competencies that Sabah secured as a founding condition of Malaysia's formation. Article V of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 explicitly grants immigration powers to both Sabah and Sarawak, distinguishing these two states from the federation's other constituents. The state government's reasoning is that these are not mere administrative conveniences but fundamental constitutional guarantees.
The emphasis on non-negotiability reflects deepening anxiety in Sabah's corridors of power about incremental federal encroachment on state prerogatives. Chief Minister Datuk Seri Hajiji Noor had previously disclosed, in mid-May, that the government had decided to postpone the Act's implementation pending ironclad assurances from Kuala Lumpur. Rather than outright rejection, the postponement strategy signals a willingness to cooperate provided Sabah's constitutional floor remains inviolate. Hajiji articulated the historical reality that Sabah and Sarawak's agreement to join the Federation was predicated entirely on retaining such immigration autonomy—remove this element, and the foundational compact itself becomes questionable.
This constitutional point carries profound implications beyond administrative procedure. The Malaysia Agreement 1963 represented a negotiated settlement that allowed former British colonies in Borneo to merge with Malaya and Singapore on terms that protected their autonomy in specified domains. Immigration autonomy was a cornerstone of this arrangement because border control directly affects a state's capacity to manage population pressures, labor flows, and security risks. For Sabah, which faces particular challenges related to irregular migration and document fraud, retention of autonomous decision-making capacity is operationally essential.
The timing of Sabah's pushback is noteworthy. Act 860 and the establishment of the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency (AKPS) represent part of a broader federal security architecture redesign. However, the law's introduction did not adequately account for or accommodate the constitutional position of Sabah and Sarawak. Rather than creating a unified national border control framework, the federal government found itself needing to negotiate with states that possess veto power over how the Act is implemented within their territories. This reveals a structural tension that the drafting process failed to resolve.
From Sabah's perspective, surrendering control over Not-To-Land notices would be particularly problematic. These instruments allow the state to exclude individuals deemed undesirable on grounds ranging from public security to public order to epidemiological concerns. They operate as a first-line defense against irregular entry and permit the state to maintain demographic stability. Transferring this authority to a federal body located in Kuala Lumpur would introduce distance, delay, and loss of responsiveness to local security assessments. Given Sabah's geography and migration patterns, this loss of agility could have serious consequences.
The state government's insistence on protecting the Sabah State Immigration Department's institutional integrity also reflects institutional and personnel considerations. The department possesses accumulated expertise in managing Sabah's particular migration challenges, established relationships with relevant stakeholders, and operational familiarity with ground-level realities. Subordinating this apparatus to AKPS oversight risks fragmentation of authority and degradation of institutional capacity built over decades.
Whatever emerges from ongoing negotiations between Kota Kinabalu and Putrajaya will likely become a template for federal-state relations involving constitutionally protected state powers. If Sabah successfully preserves its immigration autonomy intact, this will reinforce the principle that Article V rights cannot be hollowed out through ostensibly neutral federal legislation. Conversely, if the federal government succeeds in limiting Sabah's scope, this will invite similar encroachments on other constitutional protections. Sarawak is watching closely, as it holds parallel constitutional rights and will want to ensure its own position is similarly protected.
The dispute also underscores the fragility of Malaysia's federal architecture when constitutional provisions protecting state autonomy encounter modern national security imperatives. The federal government's desire to create a unified border control agency is rational; Sabah's determination to retain immigration decision-making authority is equally rational. Yet the Malaysia Agreement 1963 framework, now six decades old, does not provide clear mechanisms for reconciling these competing legitimate objectives. Resolution will depend on whether both levels of government can find creative solutions that advance federal security objectives while respecting Sabah's constitutional floor—a challenge that extends far beyond immigration to the heart of Malaysian federalism itself.
